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Abstract— Adversarial attacks are small, carefully crafted 
perturbations, imperceptible to the naked eye; that when 
added to an image cause deep learning models to misclassify 
the image with potentially detrimental outcomes. With the 
rise of artificial intelligence models in consumer safety and 
security intensive industries such as self-driving cars, camera 
surveillance and face recognition, there is a growing need for 
guarding against adversarial attacks. In this paper, we 
present an approach that uses metamorphic testing principles 
to automatically detect such adversarial attacks. The 
approach can detect image manipulations that are so small, 
that they are impossible to detect by a human through visual 
inspection. By applying metamorphic relations based on 
distance ratio preserving affine image transformations which 
compare the behavior of the original and transformed image; 
we show that our proposed approach can determine whether 
or not the input image is adversarial with a high degree of 
accuracy.  
Keywords—neural networks,machine learning models, 
adversarial attacks, adversarial detection, metamorphic testing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deep learning with neural networks [1] has become a 
very important facet of modern engineering involving 
image processing. The ability of neural networks to achieve 
high accuracy on complex tasks has led to widespread 
acceptance in consumer-facing industries. From self-
driving cars to smart surveillance cameras, we are seeing a 
gradual shift from manual control towards using trained 
neural networks [2]. However, the robustness and security 
of these methods have been called into question. Carefully 
crafted perturbations (referred to as adversarial 
perturbations) in these images have been known to break the 
best of machine learning models with a worrying degree of 
accuracy [3][5]. Fig. 1 illustrates how an airplane was 
classified as a parachute with a high level of confidence 
when the imperceptible adversarial noise gets added to 
individual pixels. Furthermore, it is possible for an external 
attacker with no knowledge of the in-house model to 
develop perturbation attacks targeted towards 
misclassifying any object as a rogue label on the in-house 
model [4].  
 
Figure 1: Adversarial Attack with Epsilon of 0.1 
Popular state-of-the-art object detection algorithms 
like YOLO[6] have been successfully attacked with 
adversarial examples [7]. This is the source of the much-
publicized example where a stop sign was misclassified by 
a moving car, just by adding tiny stickers containing the 
perturbation needed to distort the accuracy of the network 
[7]. Even commercial grade artificial intelligence models 
like the Google Cloud Vision API were successfully broken 
with black box threat models by Ilyas et al [8], causing 
images of a 3D printed turtle  to be misclassified as a rifle, 
regardless of camera angle. These examples show that 
adversarial examples can be used in the physical world to 
attack deep learning systems.  
In this paper we present an idea for detecting adversarial 
attacks at runtime. This type of technique would be of great 
value for safety critical systems that use deep learning for 
decision making. The US NAVY, which partially funded 
this work, is a case in point because they have expressed 
interest in using deep learning for various image 
classification tasks involving territory surveillance. Our 
suggested approach aims to reduce the risk of adversarial 
attacks by verifying the authenticity of the input before 
making critical decisions.  
  Our proposed approach is based on the hypothesis that 
adversarial perturbations in images can be efficiently 
detected by comparing the classification of an image with 
affine transformation of the same image. The idea is based 
on metamorphic testing principles [21] in that the approach 
should automatically, be able to detect such perturbations 
without needing to know the true output label for our test 
images (clean or adversarial). Additionally, we do not need 
to implement a machine learning model to capture the 
adversarial behavior of an image. For example, let us 
assume that the test image represents a navy ship and the 
transformation under use is rotation. If the trained neural 
network classifies the object in the image as a navy ship, 
then the same neural network should classify the rotated 
copy of the image as a navy ship as well (with little to no 
change in the prediction confidence). If the classification of 
the original and the transformed images are different and in 
accordance with the rules defined as part of our 
metamorphic relations, then, we conclude that the image has 
been manipulated. If our hypothesis is correct, our approach 
can be used for runtime verification since it can determine 
on-the-fly whether or not images serving as input to an AI-
based system are manipulated. Images that are determined 
to be manipulated would be discarded and a message would 
be sent to the commander of the ship that the AI-based 
system might be compromised.  
  
II. BACKGROUND 
There are currently two prominent areas of research on 
detecting adversarial images. a) Creating a neural 
network to differentiate adversarial images from actual 
images – This involves creating a new model which is 
trained on adversarial and clean examples labeled as their 
respective classes; thus being able to detect adversarial 
examples on test data. Methods in this category require large 
set of training data and still have a propensity to overfit. 
Additionally, they are computational- and time-intensive 
due to the complexity of the network and dimensionality of 
input images. b) Multi model prediction – These methods 
tend to train multiple models and detect adversarial 
examples under the assumption that the same example 
would be improbable to fool multiple models with 
consistency. However, this assumption may not hold. It has 
been shown that many adversarial attacks do a good job of 
generalizing between different models [8]. 
The current solutions and testing procedures for defense 
against adversarial examples on the program under test (the 
detection model) (PUT) [9] have been dodgy at large due to 
the high dimensionality in the spatial space of adversarial 
permutations. As a consequence, they do not capture 
quantifiable behavior in adversarial perturbations which 
could be used to create systematic testing procedures for 
adversarial detection. This has crippled the ability of 
machine learning algorithms in being able to prevent attacks 
with an accountable degree of accuracy. The current 
solutions face the following problems, making the task of a 
tester finding adversarial examples extremely difficult: 
1. Extensive use of computational resources to 
creating complex neural networks capable of 
capturing the permutations in adversarial noise 
vectors  
2. Voluminous demand for clean and adversarial 
examples to train and validate the model 
3. Highly expensive nature of manual work needed to 
find the “correct” label for our detection model 
The shortcomings of existing solutions inspired us to 
explore a metamorphic (testing) approach towards finding 
differentiable properties between adversarial and 
unperturbed images. Metamorphic testing is a novel testing 
procedure comprising tuples of inputs and outputs where the 
“correctness” of a test case is defined by the “degree of 
change” in the output when applying a transformation to the 
test input [11]. A conditional rule defining the degree of 
expected change in the output is defined formally as a 
Metamorphic Relation (MR). This approach towards testing 
reduces the need to expend time in formulating testing 
“oracles” that define formal relations between the input and 
output tuples.  
We hypothesize that a more efficient way to detect 
adversarial examples would be to find inherent properties in 
the behavior of these images towards affine linear 
transformations that differentiate them from regular images. 
Armed with the knowledge of probabilistic axioms 
governing these properties, we created metamorphic 
relations which would help achieve comparable/better 
levels of detection accuracy while not having to facing the 
drawbacks of current methods explained earlier. This would 
help defenders manufacture real-time defenses against 
adversarial attacks with a short turn-around time. Our 
training environment was chosen carefully to simulate data 
distributions and deep learning environments used in 
security intensive maritime environments. The 
subsequently trained deep learning model was made robust 
to image transformations using augmented training data 
constructed using random image transformations. The 
model was subsequently subjected to the untargeted Fast 
Gradient Signed Attack method (FGSM) [16] to generate 
adversarial examples. Using metamorphic testing 
principles, we established clear demarcations in the 
behavior of adversarial and clean images towards the output 
label confidence/probability when subjected to four affine 
image transforms: Rotation, Shear, Scaling and 
Translation.  
III. CONTRIBUTIONS 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper advances the 
work done towards adversarial detection and metamorphic 
testing in the following novel ways:  
• This is the first attempt at using metamorphic 
testing to move away from using the traditional 
deep learning/machine learning approach to detect 
adversarial examples on deep learning-based 
classifier models involving higher resolution 
datasets like ImageNet [10] (224x224x3)  
• This is the first attempt at using metamorphic 
testing over deep learning models built using 
transfer learning on low volume training data 
• Based on experimental results, we propose, test 
and confirm a new iterative generalization method 
useful in filtering out adversarial anomalies. 
Results from our tested hypotheses are then 
converted into probabilistic metamorphic 
relations, that minimize the constraints from 
traditional models while requiring no manual work 
in classifying the “accurate” output label for our 
test data. Our method achieves adversarial 
detection accuracies of up to 96.85% on unseen 
data. 
The results show that deep learning models used for high 
stake security intensive maritime applications would benefit 
from adopting our proposed metamorphic testing approach. 
This would not only decrease manual testing time and 
computation costs (enabling faster response time) defending 
against adversarial attacks, but would also deliver 
comparable/better accuracy. 
IV. RELATED WORK 
The process of using affine transforms as a defense 
against adversarial attacks on higher dimensional images is 
relatively untouched with there being exciting opportunities 
for future research, as demonstrated in our paper. The work 
on applications of metamorphic testing in the context of 
machine learning by Dwarakanath et al. [13] was a huge 
inspiration in encouraging us to delve further into exploring 
applications of metamorphic testing over adversarial 
examples in machine learning models. Additionally, we 
could find one instance of research by Tian et al. [14], that 
uses transformative affine procedures for detecting 
adversarial examples where they test for defense against the 
  
Carlini Wagner Attack [15] with a machine learning 
approach (combining the classifier and detector into a single 
model) achieving detection accuracy of 70% on white box 
attacks. This method was tested on lower dimensional 
datasets like CIFAR(32x32x3) and MNIST(28x28x1).  
Our work focuses on a purely metamorphic approach 
that does not require machine learning models for the 
detection model and relies on metamorphic relations 
comprising an iterative function across incremental 
degrees/units of transformation used to detect adversarial 
examples. This significantly helps with solving the oracle 
problem in testing over deep learning models. Additionally, 
we show the efficacy of our method over higher 
dimensional images like in ImageNet (224x224x3) used 
over transfer learning models. Using the Fast Gradient Sign 
Attack (FGSM) [16] as a reference adversarial example 
creation mechanism, we were able to achieve 96.85% 
detection accuracy with white box attacks on unseen data. 
V. DEEP LEARNING MODEL 
A. Developing a target model  
We first simulate a maritime environment with an in-
house neural net-based classifier using the ImageNet dataset 
for our input images. With ~200,000 images and 100+ 
categories, we decided to constrain our classifier model 
training to ~11,000 images and 15 categories applicable 
to maritime environments. The categories for our output 
labels are: lighthouse, container ship, ocean liner, parachute, 
military plane, army tank, pirate ship, fireboat, speedboat, 
lifeboat, airship, airliner, submarine, carrier ship and 
missile. 
We then trained a robust 34 layer ConvNet neural 
network augmented with augmented training data procured 
using image transformations. The model was created on top 
of a pre-trained ResNet [12] architecture; using transfer 
learning and cross entropy loss optimization to achieve a 
validation accuracy of 93% with a batch size of 32, learning 
rate of 0.001 and 25 epochs. 
B. Creating Adversarial Examples 
Adversarial perturbations are specially designed per-
pixel values which when added to the image, seem 
imperceptible to the naked eye, but cause the image to be 
misclassified. Adversarial attacks can be broadly classified 
into white-box and black-box attacks. White-box attackers 
have access to the gradients from the training process of the 
underlying model, making it comparably easier to define 
their attack strategy.  Black-box attacks on the other hand 
assume no knowledge of the model architecture or its 
underlying parameters. The attackers train a new model 
using their own images and labels; using it to construct 
adversarial examples to attack the victim’s model with. 
Since white-box attacks have been traditionally harder to 
achieve good adversarial detection accuracy levels on, we 
will concentrate our attention over the course of this paper 
to white-box attacks. 
Attacks can be targeted, or un-targeted. Un-targeted 
attacks do not attempt to change the classification to a 
specific target label. Instead, they just aim to change the 
classification to be different from the actual label. One of 
such methods called the Fast Gradient Sign Method 
(FGSM) [16]. It works by adding a pixel-wide perturbation 
on the signed gradient of the objective loss function on the 
true label with respect to the input image.  From Eq. 1.0 for 
the perturbation function, J is the loss function for an output 
classification, y. The signed gradient of J with respect to the 
corresponding input image, x multiplied by a hyper-
parameter ɛ (of range (0,1]) giving the function to calculate 
the perturbation needed to cause the maximum deviation 
from the true label. 
 
              η = ɛ*sign (∇x J(θ, x, y)) [16]   (1.0) 
 
Epsilon (ɛ) values close to 1 would mean a more visible 
perturbation in the input image after noise 
addition. According to the results obtained on our 
implementation, we were able to reduce the overall 
accuracy on unseen data of 1162 images by ~49.5% using 
only a 0.05 value of epsilon in our attack. A perturbation 
with epsilon of 0.3 caused a complete disruption of the 
model with an accuracy drop of 75%. Fig. 1.1 depicts the 
rapid reduction of validation accuracy with a gradual 
increase in epsilon. We can clearly infer that by varying the 
multiplicative term - ɛ, most images that a human would 
have no problem classifying correctly would be egregiously 
misclassified by a deep learning model.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Accuracy of the model with varying Epsilon values 
VI. THE METAMORPHIC APPROACH 
We apply metamorphic testing techniques in an attempt 
to identify if a given image is an unaltered or adversarial 
example. An adversarial example is assumed to be 
undetectable with the naked eye, but often causes the 
machine learning model to give the wrong prediction with a 
high degree of probability. 
Our methodology is based on the idea that a machine 
learning model should be robust to small transformations in 
the input image, but the perturbation added to create an 
adversarial example may not survive the same 
transformation. Given an input image I which authenticity 
is unknown, we would like to verify that it is not an 
adversarial example with a simple test. We run the model 
with two versions of the image, I and f(I), where f is a 
function that transform the image in some way. The model 
then produces two predictions, y1 and y2. If y1 and y2 are the 
same, we trust that the image was unaltered. If y1 and y2 
differ, we conclude that the image was altered and the 
adversarial perturbation caused an unstable prediction. 
  
The description above is somewhat simplified. We 
found that comparing just two outputs is not enough for a 
reliable detection. We run the transformation function 
several times with varying degrees of transformation and 
compare the outputs with the original. The comparison is 
not for equality. The output of the model is probabilistic, i.e. 
the probability that the input image belongs to a class. We 
measure how the output probability changes as the 
magnitude of the transformation increases. If the difference 
reaches a certain threshold, we conclude that the image is an 
adversarial example. 
For this study, we considered various affine 
transformation functions. The goal was to identify a 
function that would cause little or no change in prediction 
for clean images, but a big change for adversarial images. 
Below we describe the transformations and how we apply 
them in more detail. 
A. Affine Transforms 
Affine transformations are alterations on images that 
preserve both the collinearity relation between points and 
ratios of distance along the line [17]. This implies that all 
points on a straight line before the transformation remain so 
after transformations, while preserving their distance ratios.  
There are various types of affine transformations that 
linearly modify the spatial orientation of the images around 
an origin e.g. translation, scaling, reflection, rotation, shear. 
Deep learning models are generally resistant towards 
small linear transformations in clean images without 
significant loss of classification accuracy. However, since 
adversarial perturbations over the images typify a 
directional gradient to increase the loss; we hypothesize that 
a linear transformation might cause a measurable difference 
in classification confidence. This would make it possible to 
classify adversarial images from clean images by seeing 
how the models respond to their linear transformations. We 
aimed to identify a cutoff that quantifies the separation 
between the range of confidence variations for clean and 
adversarial examples. We tested our hypothesis using four 
types of affine transformations. 
B. Detection of Adversarial Examples 
We used a set of 1000 clean examples and their 
adversarial counterparts generated using FGSM with an 
epsilon value of 0.01. We purposely started with a relatively 
small set of 1000 adversarial/clean example pairs to see if 
the offset separation between clean and adversarial 
examples can be generalized without a large sample size.  
While running transformation procedures, changes 
in behavior of adversarial and clean images are measured as 
follows: 1) Perform classification on the given image 
without transformation and capture the output label, l1 and 
confidence value v1 of that label. 2) Transform the image, 
re-run the classification and capture the output confidence 
value v2 for label l1. The change in behavior is measured by 
the degree of variation between v1 and v2.  
We constrained our experiments to observing the 
variation in confidence/probability of the original output 
label l1. For the purpose of this metric we consider that to be 
the “correct” label. It is important to note that we do not 
assume prior knowledge of the correct label. I.e. we do not 
try to detect if the classifier is good, just whether the input 
image is adversarial or clean.  
 
1) Rotation Transform  
Rotation is the linear transformation of a space around a 
point of origin. We gradually increased the angle of 
rotational transformation from 0.5 degrees with increments 
of 0.5 degrees to get groups of 60 sample sets. We kept the 
increments in angles small to observe possible deviation 
characteristics in the behavior of clean and adversarial 
examples to the transformation. We showed a visual 
confirmation of our hypothesis in Fig. 3. Using small 
rotation transformation (0.5 degrees), the adversarial 
examples have much greater variation in their “accurate 
label confidence” than the clean examples. The transformed 
clean example exhibits similar probability in its previously 
classified label but the transformed adversarial image sees a 
big drop in probability on the submarine label from ~73% 
to ~13%, with its output label changing from submarine to 
carrier ship.  
 
Figure 2: Example of model performance when rotation 
transformation was applied 
 
Fig 4. Shows the variations in the classification accuracy 
of the correct label given the varying angles of rotation. We 
see a distinct drop in the label classification accuracy with 
incremental rotations of 0.5 degrees. The accuracy of clean 
images however seems to stay stable around the 100% mark. 
As mentioned before, we assume the “correct” label as the 
model’s output on the unperturbed image. We tabulated the 
variation in the confidence levels towards the correct 
classification for clean and adversarial images at 0.5 degrees 
rotation in Table 1.  
A graphical illustration of the trends between the mean 
and standard deviation of the label confidence values for the 
datasets within each of the 60 transformation groups is 
shown in Fig. 5. We can clearly see the stability in 
separation of the average values for the mean and standard 
deviation across our dataset. We decided to explore this 
  
behavior further and experiment if we could use the sum of 
mean and N times the standard deviation of clean examples 
as a cutoff to test for adversarial behavior. The N here is a 
hyper-parameter we can vary based on the distribution of 
image data. Furthermore, we observed that for some 
transformation angles, the variation in the confidence values 
between the adversarial example and its transformed image 
falls within the confidence variation range of the 
unperturbed/clean images. This results in lower accuracy 
when identifying adversarial examples. To reduce the effect 
of this anomalous case-based bias, we generalize the overall 
behavior by applying the deviation cutoff iteratively across 
multiple minutely spaced incremental rotations. We will 
henceforth refer to this method as “Hypothesis 1”. 
Using an unseen dataset of 2000 images, the adversarial 
detection accuracy using Hypothesis 1 across 60 iterations 
is shown in Fig. 6. We can see here that the detection 
accuracy has a near linear increase as the number of 
iterations of incremental rotation angle increase.  
 
 
Figure 3: Variations in the label classification accuracy 
 
 
 CLEAN ADVERSARIAL 
MEAN 0.484 32.935 
STD 2.117 28.305 
MIN 0 0 
25% 0.002 5.672 
50% 0.231 26.431 
75% 0.206 57.970 
MAX 55.519 97.710 
 
 
Figure 4: Trends in the mean and STD of confidence values 
across different rotation angles 
 
 
Figure 6 - After 60 iterations, we achieved 79.3% detection 
accuracy for adversarial examples and 97% for clean examples, with 
88.1% overall  accuracy. 
 
2) Shear Transform  
Image shear is the linear image transformation of every 
point to a fixed direction proportional to that of parallel lines 
in the plane. We again gradually increased the angle of shear 
transformation from 1 degree with increments of 0.9 
degrees to get groups of 60 samples. Similar to our 
observations on rotation transformations, we see in Fig. 7 a 
much more pronounced drop in the target classification 
accuracy for adversarial samples with an increase in the 
angle of shear. 
From Table 2, a change in shear of 1 degree causes a 
mean shift in confidence of 1.44 ± 2.75% in clean examples 
while the same transformation in their adversarial 
counterparts causes a mean confidence shift of 31.86 ± 
26.7%. Fig. 8 shows the trends in the mean and the standard 
deviation of the confidence variations with each incremental 
angle increase for the adversarial and the clean images. 
 
 
Figure 7: Variations in the label classification accuracy 
 
 
 CLEAN ADVERSARIAL 
MEAN 1.437 31.863 
STD 2.750 26.704 
MIN 0 0 
25% 0.033 5.383 
50% 0.246 27.771 
75% 1.249 55.164 
MAX 27.426 95.659 
 
Table 1. Confidence values of clean and adversarial 
examples when using rotation of 0.5 degrees 
Table 2. Confidence values of clean and adversarial 
examples when using shear of 1 degree 
  
Figure 8: Trends in the mean and STD of confidence values across 
different shear angles 
 
A clear demarcation in the mean values across the types 
of images should enable us to define clear cutoffs in 
separating the clean from adversarial examples. Towards 
higher shear values, the standard deviation average of clean 
examples averages out towards that of adversarial examples 
(using Hypothesis 1).  
Using an unseen dataset of 2000 images, the increase in 
adversarial detection accuracy using our iterative 
transformation hypothesis across 60 iterations is shown in 
Fig. 9. We observe similar behavior to that using rotational 
transformation here. 
 
Figure 9: After 60 iterations, we achieve an adversarial example 
detection accuracy of 90% and 100% for clean examples, with 95% 
overall accuracy. 
 
3) Scale Transform  
Image zooming is the linear image transformation 
involving the geometric scaling up or down of image 
dimensions and cropping into the standard dimensions taken  
by the model. In this paper, we only explore scaling down 
of an image and gradually decrease the scale of each image 
from 1 in increments of 0.05 units over 60 zoom unit 
iterations.  
Similar to our observations earlier, we see much sharper 
drops in the target classification accuracy for adversarial 
samples with increase in the negative scaling units. Fig. 10 
shows a near parallel decrease across the two sets of 
examples, which should lead to a better accuracy in 
separating the two image types. Additionally, we observe 
that the scaling unit cutoff for our observations should lie 
somewhere around the 2.0 (20th iteration) mark since the 
separation between the two image types starts reducing at 
that point. 
 
 
Figure 10:  Variations in the label classification accuracy 
 
In Table 3 we show the mean and standard deviation of 
the confidence variations at one incremental negative 
scaling unit. A change in scale of 1 unit causes a mean shift 
in confidence of 1.36 ± 2.4% in clean examples while the 
same transformation in its adversarial counterparts causes a 
mean confidence shift of 31.41 ± 24.76%. Based on the 
observations regarding setting an earlier cutoff of scaling 
units, we use Fig. 11 to observe the averaged mean and 
standard deviations of our confidence variations with 
respect to iterations having incrementally increasing 
negative scaling units (maxed at 30 to give it a buffer over 
the 20th iteration). The average standard deviation values for 
our clean samples seem to take an unexpected dive upwards 
on higher scaling units, meaning that our prediction 
accuracy improvement on the final model should be 
optimized on a much earlier iteration when generalizing our 
cutoffs across different scaling units. Using Hypothesis 1 on 
unseen data, clearly the detection accuracy stabilizes at a 
much earlier iteration (Fig. 12).  
 
 
 CLEAN ADVERSARIAL 
MEAN 1.316 31.415 
STD 2.403 24.761 
MIN 0 0.001 
25% 0.034 6.561 
50% 0.224 29.443 
75% 1.205 53.333 
MAX 12.073 84.329 
 
 
Figure 11: Variations in the mean and STD of confidence values 
across different scaling units 
  
 
Table 3. Confidence values of clean and adversarial 
examples when using negative one scaling 
  
Figure 12: After 60 iterations, we achieve an adversarial example 
detection accuracy of 85.3% and 100% for clean examples, with 
92.65% overall accuracy. 
 
4) Translate Transform  
The translate operation on images is a linear 
transformation that geometrically maps the position of each 
point to a new position using symmetric shifting. The image 
is translated both vertically and horizontally. The units of 
translation are fractions of the image width and height. We 
gradually increase the translation units from 0.05 
incremented by 0.02 units per iteration. 
From Fig. 13, we see an almost parallel correlation in 
the drops of target classification accuracy for adversarial 
and clean samples with translation across increasing units.  
In Table 4, we show the average mean and standard 
deviations of the samples at an incremental translation unit 
change. A translation of 1 unit causes a mean shift in 
confidence of 2.33 ± 6% in clean examples while the same 
transformation in its adversarial counterparts causes a mean 
confidence shift of 37.25 ± 32.83%. Fig. 14 shows a clear 
differentiation between adversarial and clean examples in 
terms of their averaged observed variation for any given 
translation transformation unit used. Using hypothesis 1 on 
the unseen dataset, after 60 iterations (Fig 15), we achieve 
stellar results with an adversarial example detection 
accuracy of 93.7% and 100% for clean examples and an 
overall 96.85% accuracy. The results from testing our 
hypothesis over the four transformations are highly 
encouraging; being able to reach over 90% accuracy on an 
average without relying on a deep learning-based model. 
Additionally, we extracted quantifiable/differentiable 
behavior in adversarial examples using a dataset of only 
1000 adversarial and clean images each. 
 
 
Figure 13: Variations in the label classification accuracy 
 
Table 4. Confidence values of clean and adversarial examples for 
1 translation unit 
 CLEAN ADVERSARIAL 
MEAN 2.330 37.255 
STD 6.013 32.832 
MIN 0 0 
25% 0.049 4.861 
50% 0.334 29.058 
75% 1.853 67.384 
MAX 74.756 99.710 
 
 
Figure 14: Variations in the mean and STD of confidence values 
 
 
Figure 15: After 60 iterations, we achieve an adversarial example 
detection accuracy of 93.7% and 100% for clean examples, with 
96.85% overall accuracy. 
 
C. Creating Metamorphic Relations 
Based on the positive results from our affine image 
transformation driven approach, we developed four 
metamorphic relations, see Table 5. We propose the 
following 4 metamorphic relations to classify examples as 
adversarial or clean images based on pre-defined 
probabilistic output relation axioms.  
1. MR-1: Rotation transformation  
2. MR-2: Shear transformation  
3. MR-3: Scale Transformation  
4. MR-4: Translate Transformation 
Let Xtrain be the training data & Xtest be the test data 
with F acting as our 34 layer ResNet child model to classify 
features to their corresponding labels.  
  
 MR-1: Rotation Transformation  
Iteratively finding confidence variation for n 
samples for every X across N different rotational angles 
tested, we obtain the mean (say M(n)) and standard 
deviation (say S(n)) of the variation for clean examples 
in Xtrain. Given a test example Xtestn, we iteratively test 
against whether the confidence variation for a 
rotational transform of X degrees is greater than M(n) + 
1.5*S(n). The individual results across N rotational angles 
are then grouped with an OR condition. If the output is 
1, Xtestn is classified as an adversarial example with 79.3% 
confidence; else we classify it as a clean example with 97% 
confidence.   
 
Table 5.  The accuracy of various transformations for a given 
unseen image dataset 
Transformation Clean 
Images 
Adversarial 
Images 
Average 
Rotation 97% 79.3% 88.15% 
Shear 100% 90% 95% 
Scale 100% 85.3% 92.65% 
Translate 100% 93.7% 96.85% 
 
  
MR-2: Shear Transformation 
Iteratively finding confidence variation for n 
samples for every X across N different shear angles 
tested, we obtain the mean (say M(n)) and standard 
deviation (say S(n)) of the variation for clean examples 
in Xtrain. Given a test example Xtestn, we iteratively test 
against whether the confidence variation for a 
shear transform of X degrees is greater than M(n) + 
1.5*S(n). The individual results across N shear angles are 
then grouped with an OR condition. If the output is 
1, Xtestn is classified as an adversarial example with 90% 
confidence; else we classify it as a clean example with 
100% confidence.  
MR-3: Scale Transformation  
Iteratively finding confidence variation for n 
samples for every X across N different scaling units 
tested, we obtain the mean (say M(n)) and standard 
deviation (say S(n)) of the variation for clean examples 
in Xtrain. Given a test example Xtestn, we iteratively test 
against whether the confidence variation for a scaling of X 
units is greater than M(n) + 1.5*S(n). The individual results 
across N scaling units are then grouped with an OR 
condition. If the output is 1, Xtestn is classified as an 
adversarial example with 85.3% confidence; else we 
classify it as a clean example with 100% confidence.  
MR-4: Translate Transformation 
Iteratively finding confidence variation for n 
samples for every X across N different translation units 
tested, we obtain the mean (say M(n)) and standard 
deviation (say S(n)) of the variation for clean examples 
in Xtrain. Given a test example Xtestn, we iteratively test 
against whether the confidence variation for a translation of 
X units is greater than M(n) + 1.5*S(n). The individual 
results across N translation units are then grouped with an 
OR condition. If the output is 1, Xtestn is classified as an 
adversarial example with 93.7% confidence; else we 
classify it as a clean example with 100% confidence.  
D. Results 
The metamorphic approach towards using properties of 
adversarial examples when transformed using the four 
relations seems to achieve high classification accuracy 
ranges bordering around 90%. Additionally, we observe that 
the shear and translate metamorphic relations are the most 
effective in detecting adversarial examples. We plan to 
study the effectiveness of using ensembles of affine 
transforms over future iterations of this paper. Additionally, 
our work opens doors towards considering affine 
transformations as a fast, lightweight and accurate way to 
detect adversarial examples over building complex multi-
layer classifier models for the same. We plan to investigate 
the effectiveness of our method over adversarial 
images generated with other attack types like Carlini and 
Wagner [15], DeepFool [20], etc. We also plan to test our 
approach over datasets such as CIFAR [18], MNIST [19] to 
test the effectiveness of our method over lower resolution 
images.  
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, we have created a naval intrinsic deep learning 
model built using the transfer learning approach on the 34-
layer ResNet architecture with 15 target labels. We then 
simulated adversarial attacks to disrupt our deep learning 
model’s accuracy; to create our training data of 1000 
adversarial/clean example pairs. We then studied the 
divergent characteristics in confidence/probability of the 
output label observed in adversarial images, when subjected 
to slight transformations in these images using affine linear 
transformations. This variation in the characteristics was 
quantified using the mean/standard deviation characteristics 
and subsequently generalized over an iterative algorithm 
comprising incremental transformation units. When tested 
on unseen validation data, our hypothesis showed very 
encouraging results. We used our successfully tested 
hypothesis to create four metamorphic testing axioms which 
are highly effective in filtering out adversarial samples. 
With our metamorphic approach in solving the problem, we 
were able to avoid using computationally intensive deep 
learning detector algorithms for our adversarial examples. 
In addition, we were able to achieve comparable/better 
results to the traditional deep learning detection approaches 
without having knowledge of the actual “correct label” or 
needing a large number of adversarial examples for training 
our models. Our devised metamorphic relations achieve 
a best-case detection accuracy of 96.85% when using 
translate transformation and gives encouraging results for 
the other three transformations too. We hope this study will 
inspire further exploration towards using metamorphic 
approaches in solving the adversarial detection problem 
plaguing the deep learning community; by studying their 
properties as a way of detecting and possibly reversing 
adversarial perturbations from different attack types.  
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